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Abstract:
 We seek to assess the effect of changes in commercial property prices on bank behaviour 
and performance in a range of industrialised economies, extending the existing micro literature on 
bank performance. The results suggest that, consistent with macro-level studies, commercial property 
prices have a marked impact on the behaviour and performance of individual banks. The signs found 
are consistent with a view that commercial property provides important forms of collateral that are 
perceived by banks to reduce risk and encourage lending. Such an impact exists even when 
conventional independent variables determining bank performance are included. Moreover, there is 
evidence that the magnitude of this impact is related to the size of the bank, the direction of 
commercial property price movements, and regional factors. The results have implications for risk 
managers, regulators and monetary policy makers. Notably, they underline the crucial relevance of 
commercial property prices as a macroprudential variable that warrants close scrutiny by the 
authorities. They also highlight the need to develop indicators of individual bank exposure to the 
property market that could help to calibrate the potential impact of changes in prices in stress tests. 
 
Keywords:
 commercial property prices, bank performance, panel estimation 
JEL classification: G12, G21 
                                                     
1  E Philip Davis: Brunel University, Uxbridge, Middlesex, UB8 3PH, UK, e_philip_davis@msn.com. Haibin Zhu: Bank for 
International Settlements, Basel-4002, Switzerland, haibin.zhu@bis.org. The authors thank Arturo Macias Fernandez for 
data support, and Sylvia Gottschalk and Andros Gregoriou as well as participants in a seminar at the International Monetary 
Fund for comments. The views expressed in this paper are those of authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the BIS. 
  
  
2
I. Introduction  
It is well-known that bank lending and bank performance have been strongly affected on frequent 
occasions by asset price fluctuations, at times culminating in banking crises. Among various key 
assets, commercial real estate is of special interest, not only because commercial property loans are 
an important component of bank assets, but also because of the widespread use of commercial 
property as collateral of other types of loans. Whereas there is a fairly extensive literature on the 
relation between bank lending and commercial property prices at a macro level (see recent work and a 
literature survey in a companion paper by Davis and Zhu (2004)), there is much less extant work on 
the impact of commercial property prices on the lending decisions, risk and profitability of individual 
banks. Evidence of a clear and consistent link to bank performance would underline the importance of 
commercial property prices as a key macroprudential indicator2, as well as being relevant to the 
monetary transmission process. 
This paper seeks to fill the gap by undertaking an extensive analysis of a sample of 904 banks 
worldwide over the period 1989-2002. We seek to assess the effect of changes in commercial property 
prices on bank behaviour and performance in a range of industrialised economies, extending the 
existing micro literature on bank performance. The results suggest that, consistent with macro-level 
studies, commercial property prices have a marked impact on the behaviour and performance of 
individual banks. Such an impact exists even when conventional independent variables determining 
bank performance are included. Moreover, there is evidence that the magnitude of this impact is 
related to the size of the bank, the direction of commercial property price movements, and regional 
factors. The results have implications for risk managers, regulators and monetary policy makers. 
To motivate the analysis, Table 1 indicates major differences in bank behaviour and performance 
during the up- and downswings in commercial property prices in 13 major OECD countries. During an 
upswing of commercial property price movements, the default risk of bank loans tends to be much 
lower, and bank profitability rises above its average. Banks are therefore encouraged to extend extra 
loans to the business sector. The reverse effects are observed when commercial property prices fall. 
We organise the remainder of this paper as follows. Section II reviews the existing literature and 
highlights the contributions of our study. Section III introduces the framework for the empirical 
analysis, listing all independent variables and their possible impact on bank behaviour and 
performance. Section IV describes the data, followed by empirical results in Section V. Section VI 
concludes. 
II.  Literature review 
Our work draws on two distinct areas of the literature, which relate respectively to the relationship 
between bank lending and commercial property prices and to bank performance per se. The former 
has to date been exclusively based on macro data, while the latter mainly uses micro data. Our 
contribution is to apply concepts in the bank-performance literature to micro data in a conventional 
manner, before estimating in the light of the credit-property price literature whether commercial 
property prices impact on bank performance over and above standard variables. Accordingly, we 
review briefly both areas of the existing literature. 
                                                     
2  See Davis (1999). In addition, in the recent draft Compilation Guide on Financial Soundness Indicators (Guide) issued by 
the IMF, real estate prices and bank exposure to the real estate sector were included in the encouraged sets of financial 
soundness indicators (FSIs).  
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II.1  The impact of commercial property price cycles on banks: a macro perspective 
There are strong linkages between commercial property cycles and credit cycles. In the finance 
literature, this interaction has been extensively explored in the “financial accelerator” framework 
proposed by Bernanke et al (1994) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). In their models, there exist credit 
market imperfections because borrowers have informational advantages over lenders regarding the 
true value of the underlying projects. To avoid the potential adverse selection problem (before the loan 
is extended) and moral hazard (after lending takes place), the lender will request the borrowers to 
provide collateral3 assets. The price of bank loans (the risk premium) then largely depends on the 
value and quality (in terms of liquidity, price volatility etc.) of collateral. This argument applies both to 
normal industrial and commercial loans and to loans to develop property per se. 
The “financial accelerator” framework, together with the fact that commercial property has been widely 
used as collateral, explains why commercial property cycles tend to have a significant impact on the 
bank lending behaviour and bank performance. Whenever commercial property prices move up, 
property-related loans are considered to be less likely to default. Therefore loan loss provisions 
decline and loan quality improves. Meanwhile, banks are willing to extend additional credit to 
borrowers (particularly in the commercial property sector), and the risk premium tends to be lower. 
Favourable financing conditions may in some circumstances drive up property prices even further, as 
investment demand for properties increases while supply is slow to respond, generating a self-
reinforcing mechanism between the commercial property cycle and the credit cycle (see the model in a 
companion paper by Davis and Zhu 2004). A further channel may arise via effects of commercial 
property prices on banks’ fixed assets, which may boost capitalisation. 
Furthermore, changes in commercial property prices also affect the banking sector via indirect 
channels, for example, through their impact on the macroeconomy. When commercial property prices 
increase above their fundamental values, constructors and developers will start new construction. The 
new construction activity generates new demand for other sectors. This can cause expansion in the 
general economy and stimulate the demand for bank credit.  
Most empirical work in this area links to residential property prices, for example country-specific 
studies which reveal strong evidence of dynamic interactions between house prices and bank lending 
in Hong Kong (Gerlach and Peng 2002), the Netherlands (de Greef et al 2000 and Rouwendal 2002) 
and the US (Quigley 1999). There are also a few studies based on asset prices that include a mix of 
residential and commercial property prices (generally with a much higher weight on residential 
property). Work by Goodhart (1995) explains credit conditions with asset prices, while Borio et al 
(1994) explain asset prices with credit conditions (debt/GDP ratio), and both find significant results. 
Hofmann (2001) includes a mixture of residential and commercial property prices in a vector-error 
correction model and again finds a strong dynamic interdependence between bank credit and property 
prices with the latter being the causal element.  
The linkage of commercial property prices per se to bank lending at a macro level has been less 
frequently explored in the empirical literature; one exception is Davis and Zhu (2004) who developed a 
reduced-form theoretical model drawing on the insights of the financial accelerator as well as specific 
features of the property market. Their model suggests that bank lending is closely related to 
commercial property prices and that commercial property markets can develop cycles given plausible 
assumptions, where the cycles are largely driven by the dynamic linkage between the commercial 
property sector, bank credit and the macroeconomy. Cross-country empirical analysis based on a 
sample of 17 developed economies confirmed the model’s predictions. An investigation of 
determinants of commercial property prices shows particularly strong links of credit to commercial 
property in the countries that have experienced banking crises linked to property losses in 1985-95. 
Further studies of dynamic interaction suggested, as in Hofmann (2001), that property prices are 
rather “autonomous”, in that they tend to cause credit expansion rather than excessive bank lending 
boosting property prices. In addition, GDP had an important influence on both property prices and 
bank credit. 
                                                     
3  There are in practice some ambiguities whether collateral reduces risk in the way bankers appear to believe (Salas and 
Saurina 2002). On the one hand, low risk borrowers may pledge collateral to signal, and collateral reduces moral hazard. 
On the other hand, pledging collateral may lead banks to neglect screening and monitoring, and better collateral may make 
banks overoptimistic. Berger and Udell (1990) find collateral is related to higher credit risk. 
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While theory and evidence predicts that higher commercial property prices drive up bank credit, their 
impact on banks’ profitability is less obvious. In the short run, increases in commercial property prices 
reduce the default probability of real estate loans and collateralised loans. The decline in non-
performing loans and loan loss provisions improve the banks’ profitability. Higher volumes of loans 
(and related fees) may compound this effect, offsetting the lower margins. In the long run, however, 
the existence of such an impact and its direction are less clear. In an efficient world, bank loan rates 
reflect the true default risk for the underlying assets, and bank profitability should solely depend on the 
risk appetite of the banks. The more risk the banks take, the higher the expected return. That is, the 
movements of commercial property prices should have already been incorporated in the pricing of 
bank loans and will not bring additional profits / losses to the banks. 
This independence no longer holds when a bank’s risk attitude changes over the cycle, or when a 
bank has distorted incentives for making loan decisions. A typical example is that, during a commercial 
property boom, banks may underestimate the default risk of property-related loans (Herring and 
Wachter 1999, 2002). Banks may also disregard the danger of adverse selection as they seek to 
expand lending at a rapid pace. This tendency towards “disaster myopia” can be attributable inter alia 
to inadequate data, poor risk management, pervasive incentives linked to the safety net, or intensified 
competition following the liberalisation of the banking sector or institutional memory loss over time 
(Berger and Udell (2003)). If default risk is not priced appropriately, the banking sector may initially 
appear to be highly profitable but will ultimately be penalised since risk premia fail to compensate 
potential losses. Another model in which bubbles and crises can arise in a rational world is developed 
by Allen and Gale (2000). They propose that important driving forces behind the upturn in the lending 
and property cycles include the risk-shifting behaviour by banks (related to agency problems) and their 
expectations of continued credit growth, which may in turn be influenced by its volatility. 
II.2 Micro-based studies of bank performance 
There is an extensive literature on bank performance so we do not attempt to cover it in full. Instead, 
we shall focus on results of typical studies, generally of international data, which cover the areas we 
intend to investigate further, notably bank loan loss provisions, bank margins and profitability, bank 
bad debts and bank lending. Our main objective is to ensure that we utilise in our empirical work those 
non-commercial property price variables that are in line with the existing literature, and hence assure 
that positive results for commercial property prices are not reflecting omitted variables bias. We also 
seek to explore any insights likely to be relevant to commercial property prices (e.g. suggesting they 
are an omitted variable in existing studies). 
In terms of provisioning, and typical of the tradition in which our own work is based, previous work 
includes papers by Cavallo and Majnoni (2001), Laeven and Majnoni (2003) and Bikker and 
Metzemakers (2004), all of whom analyse datasets similar to ours using Bankscope but with slight 
differences in sample coverage.4 A common focus of the three papers is the relationship between 
banks’ provisioning for loan losses and banks’ pre-provision income, after controlling for bank-specific 
variables and country-specific macroeconomic and institutional features. They all find a positive link 
from banks’ profitability to provisioning, as is desirable to “provision for bad loans in good times”.5 At 
the same time, provisioning decisions are also associated with economic growth, banks’ lending 
behaviour and banks’ capital strength. Real GDP growth has a significantly negative effect (Laeven 
and Majnoni (2003) and Bikker and Metzemakers (2004)), implying there is a deterioration of bank 
loan quality during economic downturns. Banks with higher loan to asset ratios tend to be involved in 
higher credit risk and therefore their loan loss provisions are higher (see Cavallo and Majnoni (op cit)). 
The effect of real loan growth rate is mixed. Cavallo and Majnoni and Laeven and Majnoni find a 
significantly negative effect, which supports the hypothesis that lending booms are associated with 
                                                     
4  Cavallo and Majnoni (2001) use a sample of 1176 banks from 36 countries over the period 1988-99, and Laeven and 
Majnoni (2003) include 45 countries with a total of 1419 banks over the same period. By comparison, the study of Bikker 
and Metzemakers (2004) covers 29 countries over the period 1991-2001. 
5  The linkage between earnings and provisioning does not always hold. Cavallo and Majnoni (2001) observe a negative 
impact of earnings on provisioning in non G-10 countries. Laeven and Majnoni (2003) confirm the negative association for 
Asian banks, and also show a strongly significant effect of a negative earnings dummy, showing that banks make provisions 
heavily by reducing capital when they make losses, “too much too late”.  
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imprudent lending practice. By contrast, Bikker and Metzemakers find a positive effect of loan growth 
on provisioning, which seems to be consistent with the view of Borio et al (2001) and Lowe (2002) that 
credit risk is built up during a boom, but contrary to these authors, Bikker and Metzemakers suggest 
banks are conscious of risk and prudently provision. Bikker and Metzemakers also find that provisions 
rise when the capital ratio is low, suggesting that banks with lower capital ratios may create extra 
provisions to keep their capital ratios adequate (the so-called capital management hypothesis 
proposed by Kim and Kross (1998)). 
In terms of bank profitability and margins a key international study is Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga 
(1999) who estimate bank profitability and interest margins on average over 1988-95 in 80 countries, 
again using Bankscope. They note that the interest margin measures profitability plus operating costs, 
plus loan loss provisioning and less non-interest income. Hence this net margin concept (also used in 
our work) differs from the simple difference between loan and deposit rates (the spread) since it allows 
for possible loan defaults reducing interest receipts, and related provisioning. They find that higher net 
interest margins and higher profitability are often associated with stronger bank capital base, higher 
inflation, higher real interest rates and lower reserve requirements. Moreover, the existence of an 
explicit deposit insurance scheme and difference in legal and institutional frameworks also has 
significant impact. In later work on a similar data set (1990-97 in 45 countries), they further point out 
that profits and margins are affected negatively by the level of financial development, implying that the 
banking sector is more competitive in advanced countries (Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2000)). 
As regards bad loan ratios Salas and Saurina (2002) model the problem loans of Spanish banks, with 
a main focus being to capture the lag between credit expansion and the appearance of problem loans. 
There is then an interest in finding whether savings banks and commercial banks behave differently 
given the control variables, which should in turn reflect the different incentives in the ownership 
structure and related corporate governance aspects. The authors examine the determinants of 
problem loans taking into account macro controls, the level of indebtedness in the non-financial sector 
and numerous bank-specific variables6, as is feasible in a study of a national market. They note that a 
recession leads to lower income to repay loans by borrowers, as well as a tightening of credit by 
banks, both of which increase default risk. The effect of recessions is aggravated by high 
indebtedness. Nevertheless, individual bank level variables also have a high explanatory power for 
credit risk even after controlling for macroeconomic conditions, especially for savings banks. In 
particular, growth policies (as shown by credit expansion and market penetration) and managerial 
incentives (linked to “gambles for resurrection”) determine future loan losses. 
In terms of lending per se, Bikker and Hu (2002) seek to distinguish between supply and demand 
factors in order to assess whether the banking system itself has a procyclical pattern of behaviour. In 
particular, in line with the so-called bank lending channel of monetary transmission, they were seeking 
to investigate whether a separate supply-channel can be distinguished based for example on 
constraints on bank capital. This follows the extensive literature on the US credit crunch of the early 
1990s which was thought to be partly linked to such supply constraints (Peek and Rosengren (1995), 
Bernanke and Lown (1991)). Data used, unlike the other studies cited, were the OECD banking sector 
data at a macro level. Demand side factors included were macro variables such as GDP, 
unemployment, inflation, share prices and real M3.  Supply side factors were the interest differential, 
non-bank deposits, capital and reserves and bank profits (current and lagged). Demand side factors 
were dominant. On the supply side, whereas capital was not significant, profit margins were significant 
and indicate a role for the bank lending channel. 
                                                     
6 Whereas many of these variables cannot be obtained with the less detailed information from Bankscope, they do highlight 
important aspects of problem loan generation, in particular that such loans are a consequence of strategic decisions driven 
by banks’ past performance. They also provide interesting justifications for the use of the variables they choose. These are: 
(1) loan growth per se (noting that market share competition leads to quality reductions in the balance sheet); (2) branch 
growth (again to underline risk of adverse selection in bank expansion strategies); (3) a proxy for inefficiency, ratio of 
operating expenses to operating margin (with a view that inefficient banks skimp on monitoring and screening); (4) percent 
of loans without collateral (highlighting that its link to risk is ambiguous); (5) size of the bank (with a prior view that larger 
banks would have lower problem loans due to better diversification – although this could be offset if there are agency 
problems between managers and shareholders); (6) lagged net interest margins (to assess whether banks with high 
problem loans take a deliberately riskier credit policy); (7) lagged capital ratios (to proxy whether the bank was “gambling for 
resurrection”), and (8) market share (whereby banks with monopoly power may take more credit risk because they can be 
sure of charging higher margins in future). 
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The previous studies highlight important aspects of determinants of banks’ lending behaviour, 
profitability and problem loan generation. However, there is no role in these studies for property price 
fluctuations to affect bank performance. To the best of our knowledge, the few exceptional studies on 
this issue are Arpa et al (2001), Gan (2004) and Gerlach et al (2003). Arpa et al (2001) looks into 
performance of Austrian banks in the 1990s. After controlling for macro factors, monetary and financial 
conditions and bank-specific variables, they find that an increase in real estate prices generates high 
profitability for banks. But surprisingly, they also find that loan loss provisions rise when real estate 
prices rise. Gan (2004) uses a special matched firm-bank data in Japan and examines the collateral-
damage effect related to the decline in property prices on bank credit allocation. She finds that banks 
tend to lend less to those who suffer greater collateral losses. Gerlach et al (2003) in Hong Kong use a 
confidential supervisory bank-level data in their panel data study. They note that bank performance is 
affected by macroeconomic developments, with smaller banks being relatively more exposed to 
changes in economic conditions that large ones are, consistent with lower diversification. The bursting 
of the property “bubble” after the East Asia crisis also put banks under stress, but surprisingly, the 
impact was smaller for those banks with high exposure to the real estate sector, suggesting that 
property-related loans may remain relatively safe assets compared with other types of bank lending. 
In this paper we extend the existing literature in several ways. This is the first international study of 
how commercial property price movements affect individual banks’ lending strategies and 
performance. Our assessment based on bank-level data suggest that commercial property prices have 
a marked impact on banks, even after we control for the effects of conventional explanatory variables, 
including macro factors, bank-specific variables and country-specific factors. Second, the micro-level 
data allow us to examine whether the determination of bank performance and the role of commercial 
property prices vary across different groups of banks and across countries. Finally, we also examine 
the interesting issue on whether commercial real estate booms and busts tend to have asymmetric 
impacts on bank performance. 
III.  Empirical framework 
In the light of the literature survey above, we now go on to use micro data to examine the connection 
between commercial property prices and bank performance. We are mainly interested in two 
questions. First, how do commercial property price movement affect banks’ lending decisions, such as 
the amount of lending and its pricing (as shown by the margin)? Second, how do commercial property 
price movements affect the bank’s performance, including loan quality and profitability? Below we 
explain briefly the empirical framework to be adopted.  
Since our focus is on the behaviour of individual banks, it is natural to use the panel approach. For 
most of the estimation we undertake standard GLS panel estimation with random effects. For some 
dynamic estimation we use the Generalised Method of Moments estimator (Arellano and Bond (1991)) 
also as a cross check. 
III.1 Banks’ lending decisions 
Our first objective is to examine the role of commercial property prices in affecting banks’ lending 
decisions in respect of loan volume growth and the pricing of loans as proxied by the net interest 
margin. Furthermore, we need to include conventional determinants of bank lending so as to ensure 
our results for commercial property prices are not vulnerable to omitted variables bias. Our model 
specifications are as follows: 
Yi,t=f(MACROt,, BANKi,t-1, DUMMY, CPPt) + εi,t      (1) 
In equation (1) Y refers to our dependent variable, namely the percentage real loan growth rate 
(dLOAN) showing the quantity of loans or net interest margins (NIM), an indicator of the price of loans 
(albeit an imperfect one, given the role of the deposit rate-interbank spread as well as the loan rate 
spread, provisions etc). In line with the literature reviewed in Section II.2, there are four sets of 
explanatory variables: 
(1) Macroeconomic variables that reflect the state of the economy. They are the growth rate of real 
GDP, inflation and real short-term interest rates (a proxy for monetary policy stance and the 
benchmark risk-free rates). These variables may be both current and lagged, given the likely delayed 
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impact on bank lending. Since we are studying advanced countries, we do not consider it necessary to 
include GDP per capita which is broadly comparable across the countries studied.7 
(2) Bank-specific variables, which we lag one period to prevent simultaneity – in particular because 
balance sheet variables are end-year. These are8: 
• Loan-to-asset ratios and the real loan growth rate (the latter excluded in its own equation), 
which proxy for the credit risk of bank assets. A higher loan-to-asset ratio implies a smaller 
investment in lower risk government bonds, therefore higher interest margins should be 
charged to compensate for the high credit risk. The impact of the loan growth rate is more 
ambiguous, depending on whether or not higher growth is associated with adverse selection, 
less strict monitoring and lower quality. 
• Capital strength, defined as the unadjusted9 equity-to-assets ratio. Typically a strong capital 
base implies a lower default probability for the bank and therefore its cost of funding is lower 
(i.e. the interest margin is higher). It also gives the bank more freedom to take advantage of 
profitable lending opportunities. Nevertheless, too-low capital ratios may induce banks to 
“gamble for resurrection”, causing opposite impacts on banks lending decisions. 
• The net interest margin in the loan growth equation as an indicator of profitability and the 
credit risk involved in bank assets.  
• We also include bank size dummies following the earlier work set out above, notably bearing 
in mind that small banks may have less interbank business and hence a wider margin for that 
reason alone. 
(3) Country dummies to capture idiosyncratic effects, in particular capturing macro, financial structure, 
financial development and law/regulation variables, to the extent they do not change markedly over 
the sample period. 
(4) The growth rate of real commercial property prices in the country concerned. Ideally we would like 
to also include individual banks’ exposure to the commercial real estate sector, such as commercial 
property loans and property-collateralised loans, but this information is not available. As noted above, 
we expect that an increase in commercial real estate prices will not only reduce the default probability 
of property loans, but also improve the quality of other bank assets through the collateral effect (for 
property-collateralised loans) and through the indirect effect on investments and macroeconomic 
developments. Therefore, we would expect a positive effect on loan growth and a negative effect on 
the net interest margin. 
III.2  Bank performance 
To study the connection between commercial property prices and bank performance, the empirical 
framework is the same as that cited above. We study determination of two variables to represent 
banks’ loan quality, non-performing loan ratios (NPL) and loan loss provisions (PROV), where the 
former reflects bad debts per se and the second the bank’s response to them in terms of reserving. 
Independent variables are similar to those for lending per se except an additional variable, earnings 
before taxes and provisions as a percentage of bank total assets (EBTDA), is included in the 
provisioning equation. This variable has proved to be very important in explaining banks’ provisioning 
behaviour in G-10 economies, as noted in Section II.2. 
We also estimate determination of return on assets (ROA) to represent banks’ profitability, while noting 
that the margin is also related to profitability (albeit omitting the influence of non interest income, 
overheads and provisions). The numerator is profits before taxes.  
                                                     
7  Besides, per capita GDP is not significant in explaining bank behaviour and performance, even when emerging market 
economies are included in the sample. See Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2000) and Cavallo and Majnoni (2001). 
8  We do not include overheads/assets and customer funding/assets since they were not significant for Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Huizinga (2000). 
9  Although Basel-risk-adjusted asset data were available for some years, use of the risk-adjusted ratio would have entailed a 
major loss of degrees of freedom. 
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The expected impacts of the principal explanatory variables on bank performance, as suggested by 
previous research and also consistent with their impact on bank lending, are summarised as follows: 
• Higher GDP growth rates, or improved macroeconomic conditions, should improve bank 
performance and reduce the probability of loan default; 
• Higher inflation could have a positive effect on bank profits, as default rates are lower due to 
lower repayment burden in an inflationary environment, as well as leading to a higher 
“endowment effect” from zero interest demand deposits; 
• The impact of interest rates on bank performance is more ambiguous. An increase in short-
term interest rates implies a tightening of monetary policy and a rise in cost of funding. 
However, this effect could be dampened or even reversed, depending how much of the 
burden could be passed through to customers; 
• A higher loan to asset ratio, indicative of a higher credit risk of bank assets, tends to be 
associated with more problem loans and extra loss provisioning. Its connection with bank 
profitability is less clear. If the bank’s risk attitude remains the same across the credit cycle, its 
profitability should be higher as a compensation for the higher credit risk.  
• Similarly, the impact of the loan growth rate on bank performance is not clear, depending 
whether it reflects a shift of the bank’s risk attitude or simply the fact that viable investment 
opportunities are available. 
• Capital adequacy has two opposite effects. If the cost-of-funding effect dominates, a higher 
equity ratio leads to higher bank profitability. If the “gamble for resurrection” effect dominates 
instead, banks with lower capitalisation will invest more on high-risk assets and the loan 
quality is impaired. 
• The collateral effect suggests that commercial property prices have a negative effect on NPLs 
and provisioning, and a positive effect on bank profitability. 
 
III.3 Subsamples and cross checks on the results 
After running the basic regressions above (with levels of macro variables and dummies, and lags of 
bank specific variables), we sought to assess whether commercial property price movements have 
different impacts on different groups of banks. The initiative is in parallel with a recent study by von 
Kalckreuth and Murphy (2003), who suggested that the impact of financial constraints on corporate 
firms is stronger for small firms. In the context of the banking industry, changes in property prices 
might have different impacts because for example large banks and small banks may focus on different 
lines of business, while their lending strategies as well as access to interbank funds may be different. 
Therefore, we also include not only size dummies but also interactive terms between, on the one 
hand, bank size, and on the other hand, commercial property price growth or macroeconomic 
variables. The model specifications that take in the size effect are: 
Yi,t=f(BANKi,t, MACROt,, DUMMY, CPPt, SIZE, INTERACTIVEi,t) + εi,t   (2) 
We also ran basic equations with a lagged dependent variable to assess robustness. This requires 
cross checking with the more appropriate Generalised Method of Moments estimation approach 
(Arellano and Bond (1991)) as also adopted in Salas and Saurina (2002). 
We then assessed results with lags to the independent variables, including commercial property itself, 
to find whether there are different effects at different lags. Notably, we might anticipate that rising 
property prices, like loan growth, may generate higher profits and lower provisions and bad debts in 
the short run, but there could be an opposite effect in the longer term when adverse selection 
becomes apparent and property prices themselves fall. 
Furthermore, we examined the issue of whether there exist asymmetric effects of commercial property 
price movements. We might anticipate that the mechanism through which the financial accelerator 
affects bank behaviour might be different during property booms and during recessions that follow a 
collapse of real estate prices. In particular, during a downturn the banks may adjust their lending 
strategies via either quantity control (credit rationing) or price discrimination (an extremely high risk 
premium). 
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Finally, given the scope of the dataset, we are able to estimate separately for the most basic equations 
the relationships for the US and Canada, European banks and banks in the Far East to assess 
whether there are regional differences in the relationship of bank behaviour to commercial property 
prices. 
IV.  Data 
Our empirical work covers 15 industrialised countries and regions, namely Belgium, Canada, Finland, 
France, Germany, Hong Kong, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Singapore, Sweden, 
Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States. We collect the data from the following 
sources: 
(1) Macroeconomic variables, including GDP, inflation and interest rates, are retrieved from the 
macroeconomic database maintained by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS). 
(2) Commercial real estate prices are available from a unique database maintained by the BIS. We 
use annual data. Note that in some countries the commercial property prices only refer to the largest 
cities rather than the whole country.  
(3) Balance sheet and income statement information of individual banks are from the Bankscope 
database over the period 1989 to 2002. The data were filtered in the following steps, similar to Cavallo 
and Majnoni (2001):  
First, we exclude the central bank, government and multilateral institutions but include all other types 
of bank and bank-like financial institutions.10  
Second, we include only consolidated bank reports over the sample period, to avoid the double 
counting problem with subsidiaries. This reduces the size of the sample in European countries, which 
often have only unconsolidated data in Bankscope. 
Third, since the current Bankscope dataset only includes bank reports in the most recent 8 years 
(1995-2002), we have combined them with a historical dataset that covers the period 1989-1996 in 
order to get a longer time series and include periods when commercial property prices were more 
turbulent. Due to discrepancies between the two datasets, we chose to restrict our analysis to data in 
the current database for those banks where there are discrepancies of over 10% in the level of total 
assets or total loans in the overlapping years.  
Fourth, we have eliminated the banks that have less than four consecutive years of financial 
statements, in order to control for the quality of bank reports.  
Finally, in order to minimize the effects of measurement errors we also remove those bank reports that 
fail one of the following filtering criteria at any particular year:11 
- the return on bank assets in absolute terms less than 10%; 
- a growth rate of bank assets (in nominal term) smaller than 50% in absolute terms; 
- a growth rate of bank loans (in nominal term) smaller than 50% in absolute terms;  
- a ratio of bank loans to bank assets larger than 10% and smaller than 90%; 
- a ratio of non-performing loans to total loans smaller than 100%. 
The resulting sample includes 904 banks with a total of 6,162 bank/year observations during the 
sample period (1989-2002). Tables 2 and 3 summarise the distribution of sample banks and the 
statistics of key variables. The US and Japanese banks dominate our sample set, mainly because we 
                                                     
10  They include bank holding companies, commercial banks, cooperative banks, investment banks and securities houses, 
medium and long-term credit banks, non-bank credit institutions, real estate / mortgage banks and savings banks. 
11  We acknowledge the possibility that the filtering scheme may also remove troubled or failed banks because their assets (or 
loans or profitability) could fluctuate substantially. 
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restrict ourselves to consolidated balance sheets only, while as noted most German and French banks 
typically submit financial reports on an unconsolidated basis. 
We have also divided our sample banks into three groups based on their importance in the national 
market. Two dummy variables, LARGE and SMALL, are used to label those banks whose market 
shares (as a percentage of the national aggregate levels of bank assets) are above 5% or below 1% 
respectively. In aggregate, 64 banks are classified into the category of “large” banks and 768 into 
“small” ones, with 76 being mid-sized. Obviously, the larger banks are more likely to view themselves 
as “too big to fail”, with an impact on moral hazard and risk taking. Table 4 summarises the 
characteristics of each group of banks. Overall, small banks have better performance; they charge 
higher interest margins; their loan quality is better and their profitability is higher as measured by the 
return on assets. However, the latter may link partly to the lesser portfolio share of low-yielding 
interbank and other wholesale assets in the balance sheet.  
V.  Empirical results 
 
Baseline results 
Table 5 summarises the pooled estimates of equation set (1) using FGLS regression. Since the 
Hausman test always indicated a preference for random over fixed effects, we have displayed random 
effects results only. As noted, all the equations include country dummies, which capture structural 
differences in banking and financial systems as well as economic performance. Our key findings 
include: 
(1) Impacts of macro variables 
• The impact of economic growth is consistent with the existing literature; higher economic 
growth encourages banks to lend more and permits them to charge higher margins (because 
the marginal rate of return is higher). It also improves the quality of bank assets (NPL and 
provisions are lower) and the profitability of the banking sector increases. 
• The impact of inflation is also consistent with economic intuition. Higher inflation drives down 
the present value of future repayments (if the interest rate does not adjust perfectly) and 
hence the default probability of bank loans is lower and the return on assets is higher. For 
profitability and margins there is also a benefit from the “endowment effect” of zero interest 
deposits. 
• Higher nominal interest rates increase the cost of funds, hurting the borrowers’ financial 
condition. As a result, bank loans are more likely to default. The profitability of banks also 
decreases, not only because of the tightened financial conditions but also due to deterioration 
in loan quality (higher NPLs). At the same time, margins widen with high interest rates, 
suggesting that deposit rates are usually less responsive to policy rates than lending rates. 
However, the pass-through is evidently not enough to generate profits for banks because of 
borrowers’ higher default rates.  
• On the other hand, the result that interest rates have a positive effect on loan growth is 
somewhat counter intuitive. Theory predicts that a tight monetary policy (high interest rates) 
constrains bank lending. One possible explanation is that the positive relationship between 
interest rates and loan growth may actually reflect the connection in the reverse direction, i.e. 
monetary policy tends to be tighter if bank credit grows faster. Also financial liberalisation, 
which leads to increased loan growth, typically also entails higher interest rates. 
(2) Bank specific variables 
• Generally, the widespread significance of these variables confirms the studies outlined in 
Section 2, which suggest that bank level variables influence credit policies, risk and 
profitability separately from macroeconomic trends. 
• The loan/asset ratio appears to have some positive link to risk in the provisions equation, 
albeit not for NPLs per se where it is insignificant. A higher loan/asset ratio is associated with 
a widening of margins, reflecting risk, but a lower return on assets, perhaps reflecting non-
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interest costs of a high level of loans in the balance sheet (provisions and staff costs). 
Meanwhile a high loan/asset ratio appears to act as an error correction term for loan growth, 
with a negative effect of the ratio on next period’s loan growth. This is consistent with banks 
having a desired loan share in the balance sheet in the long run. 
• On average, the increase in bank lending seems to be based on the viability of the project 
rather than perverse incentives. It is notable that higher loan growth tends to be followed by 
higher banking profitability and improved loan quality. Even though we also observe negative 
effects for provisions (as also found by Cavallo and Majnoni (2001)) and interest margins, they 
do not necessarily imply that banks fail to allow adequately for future loan losses when 
expanding balance sheets. Instead, they could simply be a manifestation of improved credit 
environment during a lending boom. 
• As might be expected, there is a link from the net interest margin to profits next period. 
Furthermore, a wide net interest margin tends to promote loan growth next period. There is 
also a significant positive relation between the interest margin and NPLs and provisions. For 
the former, it may be recalled that the margin incorporates a risk premium (i.e. the bank may 
be consciously taking on high risk loans), and that the premium may be expected to widen 
further when NPLs rise (if not offset by defaults on interest per se). For provisions, wide 
margins indicate sufficient profitability to make provisions as appropriate, as also found for 
profitability by Cavallo and Majnoni (2001) cited above. 
• The lagged capital ratio positively influences the margin and return on assets,, while it is 
negatively related to NPLs. The contrast between provisions and NPLs is of interest, indicating 
that banks with high NPLs typically have low capital ratios – or conversely that banks with high 
capital ratios have better risk assessment and lower incentives to take risks. Meanwhile 
capital strength is a sound financial basis for making provisions when required. This is in 
contrast with the “capital management hypothesis” as proposed by Kim and Kross (1998). The 
results for return on assets and for net interest margins are consistent with the idea that well-
run and profitable banks have high capital ratios – a low ratio is a sign of future weakness in 
terms of profitability. Also, as suggested by Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2000), well-
capitalised banks have lower bankruptcy costs, which reduce the cost of funding and 
increases profitability and the interest margin. Note that we do not find a significant direct 
effect of capital on lending over the full dataset. 
• Our results also confirm the positive effect of earnings on provisioning12. This could partly be 
explained by the “income-smoothing hypothesis”, i.e. banks use provisions to compensate for 
the difference between realised credit losses and average credit losses. This can be fulfilled 
by taking positive values (higher provisions) during cyclical expansions and negative values 
(lower provisions) during downturns. However, the positive link could also be explained by the 
possibility that higher earnings are associated with higher risk. 
• The size variable shows no difference in loan growth between small, medium and large banks. 
Smaller banks have wider interest margins, consistent with a lower volume of low-margin 
wholesale business. Small banks’ vulnerability to insolvency is indicated by the fact that they 
typically have high NPLs and lower profitability. This is in sharp contrast with our first 
impression from Table 4, suggesting that the overall lower NPLs and higher profits for smaller 
banks are related to other bank-specific factors, and smaller banks usually suffer from weaker 
credit risk assessment as well as a lower level of diversification. 
(3) Impact of commercial property prices 
• The commercial property price variable is highly significant in all five equations, which 
indicates that they are crucial omitted variables in existing studies of bank performance. 
Overall our results give strongly supporting evidence on the financial accelerator mechanism 
(or the collateral effect). 
                                                     
12 As noted, we prefer to lag this variable, in line with the other micro variables. Suffice to note here that the results are similar 
when the level of the variable is included in the provisioning equation. 
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• The impact of increasing real commercial property prices on banks’ lending behaviour is 
consistent with theoretical predictions of the financial accelerator. Higher commercial property 
prices encourage banks to lend more, and the risk premium shrinks when property prices rise. 
• Higher commercial property prices turn out to be positive news in the current period for the 
quality of bank loans and the profitability of the banking sector, since a rise in CPP leads to a 
fall in provisions and in non-performing loans. Meanwhile, there is a positive relationship to 
profitability. This is still consistent with the possibility that risk may emerge at a later date, 
since commercial property loans rarely default in the upturn.  
• Indeed, looking at the equations the other way, declining property prices are shown to lead to 
declining loan growth (which may have macroeconomic consequences) as well as wider 
interest margins and lower bank profitability, which may entail credit rationing. Equally, we see 
that falling property prices are strongly significant indicators of rising NPLs and provisions. 
Size effect 
Table 6 allows for the interaction between bank size and commercial property prices and macro 
variables. Note that size is defined in terms relative to the national market, which is the aspect relevant 
to moral hazard, “too big to fail” and the safety net. The key results are: 
• The impacts of the baseline size dummies and commercial property prices (Table 5), as well 
as macro variables and bank characteristics (not shown in detail) remain robust. 
• NPLs of small banks are more geared to the cycle than are those of large and (a fortiori) 
medium size banks. On the other hand their provisions are less cyclical, which may indicate a 
degree of vulnerability, depending on whether sufficient reserves are constituted in the upturn. 
• Interest rate rises boost the margin of small banks more than larger ones, as well as entailing 
higher provisions. Inflation has a weak negative effect on lending of small banks. 
• The economic impact of commercial property prices is as noted very robust, but its magnitude 
differs for small banks. First, small banks’ lending decisions are less dependent on 
commercial property prices than for mid-size and large banks. One possible reason is that 
small banks rely more on relationship lending and less on collateralised loans. On the other 
hand, commercial property price movements have a smaller effect on the loan quality and 
provisions than for large banks (a less negative sign is implied for CPP). Furthermore, their 
profits are less geared to commercial property prices than are those of large banks. This is 
consistent with large banks being more willing to take risk as a consequence of the safety net 
and moral hazard. 
Including lagged dependent variables 
To examine the robustness of the above results when more dynamics are allowed for, we now present 
empirical results if a lagged dependent variable is also included in the regression. 
• Table 7 shows results of estimation of the models using the FGLS method. The lagged 
dependent variables are significant throughout and particularly large in the case of the net 
interest margin, NPLs and the return on assets.  
• The results for the independent variables are quite robust, with in particular all the signs and 
significance of the CPP variables being maintained, with the exception of the interest rate 
margin where the sign and size is retained but the coefficient is insignificant. 
• We need to be cautious in explaining the results in Table 7, because including a lagged 
dependent variable causes bias in FGLS estimators when T is finite (Hsiao 1986 pp 88). 
Arrelano and Bond (1991) propose a GMM difference estimator, which is consistent in this 
situation. Nevertheless, the number of useful observations is very limited given the short time 
series in our data. For a satisfactory set of diagnostics, the GMM requires a significant 
negative first order autocorrelation and no second order autocorrelation; also the instruments 
must be shown to be appropriate by the significant Sargan test. 
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• We show 2-step GMM estimates with a difference transformation in Table 8, where the 
instruments are lagged differences of the independent variables, and the second and third lag 
of the dependent variable. These results show that the CPP effects remain robust except 
again for the bank interest margin. Hence, property prices are still shown to drive bank 
profitability and loan growth, positively, and both bad debts and provisions, negatively. There 
is generally a lower level of significance for the other independent variables, and some sign-
changes also. The much lower number of useful observations is a drawback – as little as 1640 
for bad debts. The diagnostics are generally satisfactory, although the Sargan test for 
appropriate instruments is not always significant, and only in some equations is there the 
required evidence of first order autocorrelation, although there is a general absence of second 
order autocorrelation. 
Including lagged macro variables and loan growth 
To further examine the robustness of the above results with more dynamics, as well as investigating 
longer term responses to key macro variables and loan growth, Table 9 shows empirical results if GDP 
growth, loan growth and commercial property prices are all entered with two year lags as well as (for 
GDP and CPP) current levels. This is consistent with the approach of earlier work on bad debts by 
Salas and Saurina (2002) cited above. Again, other independent variables are generally robust in sign 
and significance. 
• For GDP growth, signs for loan growth, the net interest margin and provisions are consistent 
for each of the three years – and all significant also. Hence, we have all positive and 
significant for loan growth and NIM, and negative and significant for provisions. These indicate 
that a simpler framework with a lagged dependent variable will capture the dynamic pattern 
adequately. More intriguing are the effects of GDP on NPLs and on the return on assets. Here 
we see a sign reversal, with the level and lag having a negative effect on NPLs while the 
second lag has a positive sign. A similar pattern with opposite signs applies to the return on 
assets. This may reflect simple cyclical patterns but may also indicate over-expansion of 
lending in the boom, which leads in two years to adverse effects on NPLs and profits 
• Loan growth has consistent signs in all cases except for an insignificant opposite (positive) 
sign on the second lag for provisioning. This is consistent with high loan growth being risky 
and hence necessitating provisioning, although it is notable that this result is not present for 
NPLs. A third lag may have shown a different pattern, but would have lost too many degrees 
of freedom. 
• Finally in terms of commercial property prices, only results for the net interest margin (which 
contracts when commercial property prices rise) are fully consistent with the levels result in 
Table 5. A richer and more complex pattern is shown for example for loan growth where 
commercial property prices raise lending on a contemporaneous basis but lower it a year on. 
This could link to caution by banks as to whether rising prices are sustainable. For non 
performing loans, there is a strongly negative pattern in the first and second lag, in contrast to 
the levels term which is positive. Hence, non performing loans will continue to accumulate 
even after property prices start to rise after a decline, perhaps because banks will be more 
willing to recognise NPLs when they have a prospect of selling the collateral. Meanwhile, the 
effect on return on assets is now significant at the second lag rather than contemporaneously, 
and no significant effect is detectable for provisions. 
Asymmetric effects of property price ups and downs 
To investigate whether commercial property booms and busts may have different impacts on bank 
performance, we added another explanatory variable namely positive commercial property price 
movements (which equals to zero when property prices fall). Table 10 shows the main results. 
• Compared with the baseline study, the magnitude and statistical significance of coefficients on 
macroeconomic indicators and bank-specific variables almost remain the same.  
• There is no clear evidence that commercial property booms and busts have different impacts 
on bank performance, including the quantity and quality of bank loans and the returns on bank 
assets.. However, they do affect banks’ loan pricing decisions differently. During a downturn of 
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a commercial property cycle, banks seems to rely more on pricing discrimination rather than 
credit rationing. Particularly, there is a less strongly negative effect of positive commercial 
property price movements on net interest margins. It is likely that banks tend to charge a very 
high risk premium when commercial property prices fall in order to compensate for the risk or 
to discourage loan application. In other words, the financial accelerator mechanism probably 
works more strongly in the downturns. There is also a similar effect on provisioning which is 
close to the 10% significance level, implying provisioning falls less in upturns than it rises in 
downturns in commercial property prices. Again, this asymmetry implies additional concern of 
banks over risk in downturns. 
Separate estimation for Europe, America and Asia 
We broke down the dataset into three geographical subcomponents, largely to investigate whether the 
commercial property price results are consistent. We do not comment in detail on the other results, 
which nevertheless may be of considerable interest. 
• European banks (Table 10) respond to commercial property prices similarly to the full sample 
for loan growth, net interest margins, provisioning and returns on assets. The effect on NPLs 
is close to zero. European bank lending is strongly capital driven, with no significant portfolio 
effect from the loan-to-asset ratio. This indicates a powerful supply-side role for capital in 
lending which is absent from the full sample. 
• Asian banks’ results are less well determined than the other groups, with a small number of 
observations (with a dominance of Japanese banks). In this case many baseline results do not 
pass (Table 12) – probably reflecting different arrangements and non-conventional economic 
environment in some Asian financial systems. Property price movements have a much 
stronger positive effect on loan growth than in other areas, suggesting the importance of the 
commercial property sector in these economies. Nevertheless, the effects of commercial 
property prices on interest margins, profits, provisions and problem loans are no longer 
significant. Another intriguing result is that loan growth is negatively related to capital 
adequacy, suggesting potential “gambling for resurrection” and related moral hazard. The 
same phenomenon has also been documented by Inaba et al (2003). Moreover, loan growth 
is also negatively related to GDP growth, unlike in the other groups. 
• American banks (Table 13) follow the full panel for effects of commercial property prices on 
the net interest margin, NPLs and the return on assets. US banks’ bad debts are hence 
indicated to be more strongly driven by commercial property than Europeans’ are. 
Furthermore, provisioning is positively linked to CPP – banks raise provisions when 
commercial property prices rise, in contrast to the balance of the sample as a whole. No 
capital adequacy effect is detectable on lending per se; the portfolio effect on lending is 
significant, however. 
VI. Conclusions 
We contend that our results indicate that commercial property prices have a major impact on a wide 
range of bank performance variables, ranging from risk indicators to profitability and lending activity – 
an impact omitted from most of the existing literature. The signs found are consistent with a view that 
commercial property provides important forms of collateral that are perceived by banks to reduce risk 
and encourage lending. These results hold consistently across a number of econometric 
specifications, as well as for regions. There are some interesting differences in the response of small 
and large banks, with in particular commercial property price movements having a smaller effect on 
the loan quality and provisions for small banks than for large banks. Furthermore, their profits are less 
geared to commercial property prices than are those of large banks. This is consistent with large 
banks being more willing to take risk as a consequence of the safety net and moral hazard. Generally, 
and notably in combination with the macro results in Davis and Zhu (2004), these results underline the 
crucial relevance of commercial property prices as a macroprudential variable that warrants close 
scrutiny by the authorities. They also highlight the need to develop indicators of individual bank 
exposure to the property market that could help to calibrate the potential impact of changes in prices.  
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Table 1 
Bank lending and bank performance at different stages of commercial property cycles 
(1979-2001) 
Growth rate of 
bank loans (%) 
Growth rate of 
risk-weighted 
assets (%) 
Return on 
assets (%) 
Provisions on 
loans as a 
percentage of 
net income (%) 
Memo: number 
of years 
Country 
Up 
swing1 
Down 
swing 
Up 
swing 
Down 
swing 
Up 
swing  
Down 
swing 
Up 
swing 
Down 
swing 
Up 
swing  
Down 
swing 
Belgium 
Canada 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Italy 
Japan 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
UK 
US 
8.69 
6.51 
11.02 
7.42 
7.33 
13.02 
12.34 
13.25 
15.00 
11.39 
8.58 
10.48 
9.64 
4.75 
8.16 
-1.73 
2.67 
8.58 
7.77 
-0.18 
10.20 
10.03 
8.41 
4.70 
10.45 
5.07 
7.86 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
9.19 
-- 
13.62 
9.59 
5.26 
3.47 
9.74 
9.59 
3.42 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
3.29 
-8.87 
5.89 
-0.13 
8.26 
1.17 
14.68 
3.62 
0.38 
1.00 
0.21 
0.44 
0.54 
1.04 
0.48 
0.69 
0.94 
0.73 
0.68 
1.02 
1.39 
0.34 
1.01 
0.32 
0.27 
0.59 
0.70 
-0.08 
0.58 
0.02 
0.74 
0.57 
0.85 
1.17 
17.13 
32.33 
37.02 
30.63 
39.79 
25.73 
6.98 
18.84 
23.32 
56.10 
-- 
-- 
22.59 
21.36 
34.89 
27.95 
58.25 
41.44 
37.97 
57.02 
24.69 
145.92 
40.87 
-- 
-- 
39.52 
14 
9 
18 
14 
14 
8 
12 
15 
14 
16 
11 
11 
9 
9 
7 
5 
9 
9 
10 
11 
8 
9 
7 
12 
12 
14 
Average 10.36 6.07 8.54 3.48 0.73 0.55 28.22 48.17   
1
 “Up (down) swing” refers to the years when real commercial property prices in that country increase (decrease).  
Sources: OECD; BIS; authors’ calculations. 
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Table 2 
Distribution of sample banks 
By country Number of banks By specialisation Number of banks 
Belgium 
Canada 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Hong Kong 
Italy 
Japan 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Singapore 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
United Kingdom 
United States 
19 
21 
4 
58 
40 
13 
38 
143 
8 
14 
5 
5 
28 
54 
454 
Bank holding company 
Commercial bank 
Cooperative bank 
Investment bank / 
securities house 
Median and long term 
credit bank 
Non-banking credit 
institution 
Real estate / Mortgage 
bank 
Savings bank 
428 
269 
67 
36 
 
12 
 
26 
 
37 
 
29 
Total 904 
 
Total 904 
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Table 3 
Summary statistics of regression variables 
Variables No. Obs Mean (%) Std. Dev. (%) Min (%) Max (%) 
Asset growth 
rate 
5244 8.13 10.90 -49.17 49.72 
Loan growth 
rate 
5132 8.54 12.03 -49.98 49.98 
Loan to asset 
ratio 
6025 61.07 15.22 11.27 89.86 
Net Interest 
Margin (NIM) 
5980 3.39 2.19 -5.88 36.72 
Non-Performing 
Loan ratio 
(NPL) 
4353 2.44 3.91 0.00 45.79 
Return on 
Assets (ROA) 
6056 0.85 0.90 -7.65 8.79 
Provisions / 
Total Assets 
5844 0.40 0.65 -2.16 16.36 
GDP growth 
rate 
12656 2.44 2.11 -7.85 15.57 
Inflation 12656 2.57 1.66 -4.04 10.97 
Interest rate 12656 5.22 2.83 0.09 14.76 
Growth rate of 
real commercial 
property prices  
12651 -3.94 10.85 -49.19 35.49 
 
Table 4 
Characteristics of banks grouped by sizes1  
Large banks Mid-sized banks Small banks 
Variables 
Mean Std dev Mean Std dev Mean Std dev 
Loan growth rate 5.91 10.36 5.45 11.90 9.12 12.11 
Loan to asset ratio 54.79 14.49 62.33 14.93 61.52 15.19 
NIM 1.82 0.86 2.13 1.45 3.67 2.23 
NPL 4.58 4.06 4.34 6.23 2.15 3.58 
ROA 0.37 0.58 0.44 0.81 0.94 0.91 
1
 There are 62 large banks, 76 mid-sized banks and 766 small banks. 
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Table 5 
Pooled regression with random effects 
Dependent 
variables 
Loan growth 
rate 
NIM NPL ROA Provisions/ 
Total Assets 
Constant 8.8*** 
(6.1) 
1.94*** 
(7.8) 
1.4** 
(2.4) 
0.42*** 
(3.2) 
-0.21** 
(2.4) 
Macro 
indicators 
     
GDP growth 0.44*** 
(5.2) 
0.05*** 
(10.6) 
-0.046** 
(2.2) 
0.026*** 
(3.7) 
-0.013*** 
(2.8) 
Inflation -0.18 
(0.9) 
0.007 
(0.6) 
-0.58*** 
(10.2) 
0.14*** 
(8.6) 
-0.048*** 
(4.4) 
Interest rate 0.42*** 
(4.0) 
0.07*** 
(11.0) 
0.12*** 
(4.4) 
-0.053*** 
(5.8) 
0.007 
(1.2) 
Bank 
indicators 
     
Loan/Asset (-1) -0.083*** 
(5.6) 
0.01*** 
(6.3) 
-0.0023 
(0.4) 
-0.0057*** 
(4.1) 
0.0037*** 
(4.1) 
Loan growth 
rate (-1) 
 -0.0028*** 
(3.3) 
-0.022*** 
(6.6) 
0.0053*** 
(4.6) 
-0.0043*** 
(5.6) 
NIM (-1) 0.47*** 
(3.6) 
 0.14** 
(2.5) 
0.27*** 
(23.4) 
0.007* 
(8.7) 
Capital ratio (-1) 0.084 
(1.3) 
0.053*** 
(8.5) 
-0.114*** 
(5.2) 
0.052*** 
(8.9) 
0.0066* 
(1.6) 
EBTDA/Total 
assets (-1) 
    0.06*** 
(5.6) 
SMALL Insig 0.74*** 
(3.5) 
1.0** 
(2.5) 
-0.25*** 
(3.2) 
-0.11** 
(2.3) 
LARGE Insig Insig Insig Insig Insig 
Commercial 
property sector 
     
D(CPP) 0.16*** 
(9.4) 
-0.0095*** 
(8.8) 
-0.02*** 
(4.0) 
0.0095*** 
(6.1) 
-0.0049*** 
(4.8) 
No. Obs. 
Adj. R2 
5052 
0.12 
4195 
0.31 
3069 
0.49 
4182 
0.5 
4060 
0.3 
Note: The definitions of explanatory variables are as follows. The three macroeconomic indicators are the annual growth rate 
of real GDP, inflation rate and the nominal short-term interest rate. Bank-specific variables are the ratio of bank loans to total 
bank assets, the growth rate of real bank loans, the net interest margin, the ratio of equity capital to total bank assets, and 
earnings before taxes and provisions as a percentage of total bank assets (only entered in the provisions equation). The two 
dummy variables LARGE and SMALL refer to those banks whose market share (as a percentage of the national level) in 
term of bank assets is above 5% and below 1%, respectively D(CPP) is the annual growth rate of real commercial property 
prices in the home country. All the variables except the two dummies are defined in percentages. 
t-statistics in parentheses; * shows significance of the test statistic at 90%, ** and *** at 95% and 99% respectively. 
Equations include country dummies (not shown in detail). 
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Table 6 
Pooled regression with random effects and leveraged size effects 
 
Dependent 
variables 
Loan growth 
rate 
NIM NPL ROA Provisions/ 
Total Assets 
SMALL Insig 0.42* 
(1.9) 
1.1** 
(2.3) 
-0.23** 
(2.0) 
-0.29** 
(2.3) 
LARGE Insig Insig Insig Insig Insig 
GDP*SMALL Insig Insig -0.24*** 
(4.1) 
Insig 0.022* 
(1.6) 
GDP*LARGE Insig Insig -0.16* 
(1.9) 
Insig Insig 
IR*SMALL Insig 0.08** 
(3.8) 
Insig Insig 0.043** 
(2.3) 
IR*LARGE Insig Insig Insig Insig Insig 
INF*SMALL -0.94* 
(1.6) 
Insig Insig Insig Insig 
INF*LARGE Insig Insig Insig Insig Insig 
D(CPP) 0.26*** 
(5.1) 
-0.01*** 
(3.1) 
-0.053*** 
(3.4) 
0.019*** 
(4.0) 
-0.0168*** 
(5.6) 
D(CPP)*SMALL -0.11** 
(2.2) 
Insig 0.04** 
(2.3) 
-0.011** 
(2.2) 
0.014*** 
(4.4) 
D(CPP)*LARGE 
 
Insig 0.0082* 
(1.8) 
Insig Insig Insig 
No. Obs. 
Adj. R2 
5052 
0.12 
4195 
0.31 
3069 
0.49 
4182 
0.50 
4060 
0.3 
Note: See Table 5. t-statistics in parentheses; * shows significance of the test statistic at 90%, ** and *** at 95% and 99% 
respectively. Equations include country dummies and other independent variables (not reported in detail) 
  
  
20 
 
 
Table 7 
Pooled regression with random effects and lagged dependent variables 
Dependent 
variables 
Loan growth 
rate 
NIM NPL ROA Provisions/ 
Total Assets 
Constant 6.6*** 
(4.5) 
0.032 
(0.6) 
-0.17 
(0.6) 
0.33*** 
(3.4) 
-0.15** 
(2.0) 
Lagged 
variable 
0.16*** 
(10.4) 
0.93*** 
(224.0) 
0.77*** 
(77.2) 
0.54*** 
(6.0) 
0.32*** 
(21.2) 
Macro 
indicators 
     
GDP growth 0.59*** 
(6.2) 
0.021*** 
(6.1) 
-0.076*** 
(5.0) 
0.039*** 
(6.0) 
-0.02*** 
(4.1) 
Inflation -0.52** 
(2.4) 
0.043*** 
(5.8) 
-0.26*** 
(6.0) 
0.076*** 
(5.2) 
-0.029*** 
(2.8) 
Interest rate 0.31*** 
(2.6) 
-0.016*** 
(3.9) 
0.11*** 
(5.2) 
-0.032*** 
(3.9) 
0.006 
(1.1) 
Bank 
indicators 
     
Loan/Asset (-1) -0.065*** 
(4.3) 
0.0011** 
(2.3) 
0.008*** 
(2.9) 
-0.0031*** 
(3.2) 
0.002*** 
(2.8) 
Loan growth 
rate (-1) 
 -0.0027*** 
(5.2) 
-0.035 
(1.5) 
0.0005 
(0.5) 
-0.0017*** 
(2.3) 
NIM (-1) 0.48*** 
(3.9) 
 -0.032 
(1.1) 
0.13*** 
(14.7) 
0.0005*** 
(6.y) 
Capital ratio (-1) 0.013 
(0.2) 
0.0039* 
(1.8) 
-0.024** 
(2.1) 
0.0084* 
(1.9) 
0.0056* 
(1.6) 
EBTDA/Total 
assets (-1) 
    0.057*** 
(5.1) 
SMALL     -0.083** 
(2.0) 
LARGE     0.0047 
(0.1) 
Commercial 
property sector 
     
D(CPP) 0.12*** 
(5.7) 
-0.01 
(1.4) 
-0.021*** 
(5.7) 
0.0041*** 
(2.9) 
-0.0035*** 
(3.5) 
No. Obs. 
Adj. R2 
4185 
0.17 
4180 
0.97 
2962 
0.87 
4182 
0.66 
4059 
0.43 
Note: See Table 5. t-statistics in parentheses; * shows significance of the test statistic at 90%, ** and *** at 95% and 99% 
respectively. 
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Table 8 
Pooled regression with random effects, difference specification and lagged dependent 
variables (2 step GMM estimation) 
Dependent 
variables 
Loan growth 
rate 
NIM NPL ROA Provisions/ 
Total Assets 
Constant -2.2 
(0.7) 
0.02 
(0.4) 
0.5* 
(1.8) 
0.03 
(0.3) 
0.02 
(0.7) 
D.Lagged 
variable 
0.096*** 
(2.6) 
0.73*** 
(5.9) 
0.73*** 
(10.0) 
0.38** 
(2.5) 
 
-0.1 
(0.6) 
Macro 
indicators 
     
D.GDP growth -0.054 
(0.3) 
0.028*** 
(2.8) 
0.08 
(1.4) 
0.033* 
(1.8) 
-0.02 
(1.4) 
D.Inflation -3.1*** 
(3.7) 
0.11** 
(2.1) 
0.3 
(1.0) 
0.22*** 
(3.3) 
-0.12*** 
(2.8) 
D.Interest rate 1.6*** 
(3.3) 
-0.052 
(1.5) 
-0.0008 
(0.1) 
-0.08** 
(2.3) 
0.037 
(1.1) 
Bank 
indicators 
     
D.Loan/Asset   
(-1) 
-0.71** 
(2.0) 
-0.033** 
(2.0) 
0.1 
(1.5) 
-0.064** 
(2.0) 
0.012 
(0.8) 
D Loan growth 
rate (-1) 
 -0.0014 
(0.6) 
-0.003 
(0.4) 
0.0014 
(1.4) 
-0.0031 
(1.6) 
D.NIM (-1) -6.9** 
(2.3) 
 0.4 
(1.4) 
0.4 
(1.6) 
-0.015 
(0.1) 
D.Capital ratio  
(-1) 
1.7 
(0.8) 
-0.068 
(0.9) 
0.1 
(0.5) 
0.09 
(0.7) 
-0.2** 
(2.5) 
D. EBTDA/Total 
assets (-1) 
    0.092 
(1.2) 
Commercial 
property sector 
     
D.D(CPP) 0.103* 
(1.8) 
0.0007 
(0.3) 
-0.04** 
(2.4) 
0.013*** 
(3.1) 
-0.0066** 
(2.1) 
No. Obs 3282 2454 1640 2441 2392 
Joint Wald 
Sargan 
AR(1) 
AR(2) 
62.4 [0.00] 
24.9 [0.2] 
-5.5 [0.0] 
-0.27 [0.78] 
64.1 [0.00] 
47.5 [0.0] 
-3.3 [0.01] 
-0.3 [0.8] 
168 [0.0] 
31.9 [0.03] 
-2.9 [0.004] 
0.3 [0.75] 
30.3 [0.0] 
28.7[0.07] 
-2.7 [0.006] 
-1.3 [0.2] 
44.7 [0.00] 
109.9 [0.003] 
-1.96 [0.05] 
-1.05 [0.29] 
Note: See Table 5. All variables are differenced (denoted by “D”) compared to the other tables, hence are in first or second 
difference form. D(CPP) is the annual growth rate of real commercial property prices in the home country; t-statistics in 
parentheses; * shows significance of the test statistic at 90%, ** and *** at 95% and 99% respectively. Equations include 
country dummies and small/large bank dummies (not reported in detail). The instruments are the first differenced lags of the 
independent variables and the second and third lags of the dependent variable. 
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Table 9 
Pooled regression with random effects and lagged macro variables 
 
Dependent 
variables 
Loan growth 
rate 
NIM NPL ROA Provisions/ 
Total Assets 
Constant 6.2*** 
(3.8) 
1.6*** 
(5.9) 
1.2* 
(1.8) 
0.5*** 
(3.4) 
-0.122 
(1.2) 
Macro 
indicators 
     
GDP growth 0.73*** 
(6.2) 
0.046*** 
(7.1) 
-0.13*** 
(4.4) 
0.049*** 
(5.5) 
-0.027*** 
(4.7) 
GDP growth(-1) 0.81*** 
(5.6) 
0.03*** 
(3.8) 
-0.19*** 
(5.1) 
0.04*** 
(3.6) 
-0.024*** 
(3.4) 
GDP growth(-2) 0.42*** 
(3.0) 
0.021*** 
(2.8) 
0.11*** 
(3.3) 
-0.02* 
(1.9) 
-0.038*** 
(5.6) 
Inflation -0.96*** 
(3.7) 
0.035** 
(2.2) 
-0.58*** 
(7.6) 
0.13*** 
(6.2) 
-0.011 
(1.2) 
Interest rate -0.16 
(1.0) 
0.035*** 
(3.8) 
0.24*** 
(5.4) 
-0.065*** 
(5.3) 
0.0011 
(1.5) 
Bank 
indicators 
     
Loan/Asset (-1) -0.072*** 
(4.4) 
0.013*** 
(6.3) 
0.00081 
(0.1) 
-0.0057*** 
(3.6) 
0.0031*** 
(3.1) 
Loan growth 
rate (-1) 
0.16*** 
(9.5) 
-0.0016* 
(1.7) 
-0.026*** 
(6.8) 
0.0063*** 
(4.8) 
-0.004*** 
(4.9) 
Loan growth 
rate (-2) 
0.04*** 
(2.6) 
-0.002** 
(2.0) 
-0.02*** 
(5.2) 
0.0004 
(0.3) 
0.0006 
(0.7) 
NIM (-1) 0.41*** 
(3.1) 
 0.15** 
(2.3) 
0.28*** 
(21.3) 
0.0081*** 
(3.1) 
Capital ratio (-1) -0.016 
(0.2) 
0.081*** 
(11.1) 
-0.11*** 
(4.3) 
0.038*** 
(5.7) 
0.007 
(1.5) 
EBTDA/Total 
assets (-1) 
    0.069*** 
(5.3) 
SMALL 0.19 
(0.2) 
0.66*** 
(3.0) 
0.93** 
(2.1) 
-0.27*** 
(3.0) 
-0.07 
(1.1) 
LARGE 1.1 
(1.0) 
0.28 
(0.9) 
-0.31 
(0.5) 
-0.15 
(1.3) 
0.022 
(0.3) 
Commercial 
property sector 
     
D(CPP) 0.068** 
(2.4) 
-0.0049*** 
(3.4) 
0.013* 
(1.9) 
0.002 
(1.0) 
-0.0012 
(1.0) 
D(CPP)(-1) -0.058** 
(2.1) 
-0.0079*** 
(5.2) 
-0.024*** 
(3.2) 
0.0002 
(0.1) 
0.0008 
(0.6) 
D(CPP)(-2) -0.012 
(0.6) 
-0.011*** 
(8.8) 
-0.021*** 
(3.8) 
0.081** 
(2.3) 
-0.0008 
(0.7) 
No. Obs. 
Adj. R2 
3316 
0.19 
3324 
0.33 
2416 
0.48 
3313 
0.5 
32160.34 
Note: See Table 5. t-statistics in parentheses; * shows significance of the test statistic at 90%, ** and *** at 95% and 99% 
respectively; regressions also include country dummies (not shown). 
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Table 10 
Pooled regression with asymmetric effects of commercial property price movements 
Dependent 
variables 
Loan growth 
rate 
NIM NPL ROA Provisions/ 
Total Assets 
Constant 10.6*** 
(6.7) 
2.0*** 
(8.2) 
1.52** 
(2.6) 
0.41*** 
(3.1) 
-0.23** 
(2.6) 
Macro 
indicators 
     
GDP growth 0.43*** 
(5.5) 
0.052*** 
(11.6) 
-0.042** 
(2.0) 
0.026*** 
(3.7) 
-0.014*** 
(2.9) 
Inflation -0.16 
(0.9) 
0.011 
(0.9) 
-0.60*** 
(10.2) 
0.15*** 
(8.6) 
-0.046*** 
(4.2) 
Interest rate 0.45*** 
(4.6) 
0.068*** 
(11.9) 
0.126*** 
(4.4) 
-0.054*** 
(5.9) 
0.006 
(1.0) 
Bank 
indicators 
     
Loan/Asset (-1) -0.13*** 
(7.9) 
0.01*** 
(6.8) 
-0.002 
(0.5) 
-0.0057*** 
(4.1) 
0.0037*** 
(4.1) 
Loan growth 
rate (-1) 
 -0.0029*** 
(3.9) 
-0.022*** 
(6.9) 
0.0053*** 
(4.6) 
-0.0043*** 
(5.6) 
NIM (-1) 0.38*** 
(2.7) 
 0.145*** 
(2.6) 
0.27*** 
(23.3) 
0.0072*** 
(8.2) 
Capital ratio (-1) 0.20*** 
(2.9) 
0.048*** 
(8.5) 
-0.116*** 
(5.3) 
0.052*** 
(8.9) 
0.0069* 
(1.7) 
EBTDA/Total 
assets (-1) 
    0.066*** 
(5.5) 
SMALL -0.02 
(0.02) 
0.76*** 
(3.6) 
1.00** 
(2.5) 
-0.25*** 
(3.2) 
-0.12** 
(2.3) 
LARGE 0.87 
(0.7) 
0.16 
(0.5) 
-0.434 
(0.8) 
-0.12 
(1.2) 
-0.005 
(0.1) 
Commercial 
property sector 
     
D(CPP) 0.14*** 
(5.1) 
-0.014*** 
(8.2) 
-0.01 
(1.1) 
0.0077*** 
(2.7) 
-0.0075*** 
(3.9) 
D(CPP) 
*dummy(DCPP) 
0.04 
(0.86) 
0.0096*** 
(3.4) 
-0.02 
(1.3) 
0.0034 
(0.7) 
0.0051 
(1.6) 
No. Obs. 
Adj. R2 
5027 
0.11 
4170 
0.31 
3042 
0.49 
4156 
0.50 
4059 
0.30 
Note: See Table 5. t-statistics in parentheses; * show significance of the test statistic at 90%, ** and *** at 95% and 99% 
respectively. Equations include country dummies (not shown in detail). 
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Table 11 
Pooled regression with random effects - European banks 
Dependent 
variables 
Loan growth 
rate 
NIM NPL ROA Provisions/ 
Total Assets 
Constant 2.4 
(0.6) 
1.5 
(1.4) 
10.2*** 
(3.2) 
0.012 
(0.1) 
0.98** 
(2.6) 
Macro 
indicators 
     
GDP growth 0.42** 
(2.1) 
0.09*** 
(7.3) 
-0.064 
(0.7) 
0.03** 
(2.2) 
-0.00027 
(0.25) 
Inflation 0.12 
(0.3) 
-0.025 
(0.9) 
-0.77*** 
(3.3) 
0.13*** 
(3.8) 
-0.056** 
(2.3) 
Interest rate -0.18 
(0.9) 
0.14*** 
(10.1) 
0.049 
(0.4) 
-0.065*** 
(3.7) 
0.067*** 
(5.3) 
Bank 
indicators 
     
Loan/Asset (-1) -0.024 
(1.1) 
-0.0044 
(1.4) 
-0.035* 
(1.7) 
-0.0062*** 
(3.0) 
0.003 
(1.58) 
Loan growth 
rate (-1) 
 -0.0032** 
(2.0) 
-0.063*** 
(4.8) 
0.0074*** 
(3.9) 
-0.0054*** 
(3.8) 
NIM (-1) 0.17 
(1.0) 
 0.71*** 
(2.7) 
0.18*** 
(10.4) 
0.062*** 
(4.9) 
Capital ratio (-1) 0.236** 
(2.4) 
0.114*** 
(9.3) 
-0.32*** 
(3.8) 
0.088*** 
(9.8) 
0.37 
(0.6) 
EBTDA/Total 
assets (-1) 
    Insig 
SMALL -0.06 
(0.1) 
0.58 
(1.4) 
3.1** 
(2.4) 
-0.16 
(1.3) 
0.14* 
(1.7) 
LARGE 1.1 
(0.7) 
0.13 
(0.3) 
1.6 
(1.1) 
-0.12 
(0.8) 
0.12 
(1.3) 
Commercial 
property sector 
     
D(CPP) 0.146*** 
(5.8) 
-0.0064*** 
(3.9) 
0.003 
(0.2) 
0.006*** 
(2.9) 
-0.0023* 
(1.6) 
No. Obs. 
Adj. R2 
1712 
0.05 
1462 
0.22 
521 
0.21 
1454 
0.47 
1373 
0.21 
Note: See Table 5. t-statistics in parentheses; * shows significance of the test statistic at 90%, ** and *** at 95% and 99% 
respectively. Equations include country dummies (not shown in detail). 
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Table 12 
Pooled regression with random effects - Asian Banks 
Dependent 
variables 
Loan growth 
rate 
NIM NPL ROA Provisions/ 
Total Assets 
Constant 25.1*** 
(5.5) 
-1.39 
(1.4) 
Insig 4.4*** 
(5.3) 
-2.2*** 
(3.0) 
Macro 
indicators 
     
GDP growth -0.28*** 
(3.0) 
-0.013 
(1.4) 
0.15*** 
(2.6) 
0.012 
(0.6) 
-0.0026 
(0.2) 
Inflation 0.44** 
(2.1) 
0.072*** 
(3.2) 
-1.2*** 
(8.4) 
0.063* 
(1.7) 
-0.022 
(0.7) 
Interest rate 0.35* 
(1.6) 
-0.11*** 
(4.5) 
0.26 
(0.8) 
0.073* 
(1.7) 
-0.13*** 
(3.9) 
Bank 
indicators 
     
Loan/Asset (-1) -0.28*** 
(6.5) 
0.043*** 
(5.9) 
0.027 
(0.8) 
-0.02** 
(2.5) 
0.02*** 
(3.0) 
Loan growth 
rate (-1) 
 0.017*** 
(4.5) 
-0.013 
(0.5) 
0.016** 
(2.2) 
-0.01(1.7) 
NIM (-1) 1.26*** 
(5.5) 
 0.4*** 
(2.7) 
0.72*** 
(16.9) 
-0.0027(0.6) 
Capital ratio (-1) -0.36** 
(2.6) 
0.0455** 
(2.5) 
-0.39*** 
(4.7) 
-0.205*** 
(8.1) 
0.095*** 
(4.8) 
EBTDA/Total 
assets (-1) 
    0.13** 
(2.2) 
SMALL 2.85*** 
(2.9) 
0.93*** 
(2.8) 
0.7 
(0.8) 
-0.31* 
(1.7) 
-0.5*** 
(3.0) 
LARGE 1.1 
(0.9) 
0.07 
(0.1) 
-1.4 
(1.0) 
-0.035 
(0.1) 
0.077 
(0.3) 
Commercial 
property sector 
     
D(CPP) 0.268*** 
(5.6) 
0.0062 
(1.5) 
-0.028 
(0.3) 
0.003 
(0.4) 
-0.0033 
(0.5) 
No. Obs. 
Adj. R2 
643 
0.3 
495 
0.32 
321 
0.04 
491 
0.56 
452 
0.42 
Note: See Table 5. t-statistics in parentheses; * shows significance of the test statistic at 90%, ** and *** at 95% and 99% 
respectively. Equations include country dummies (not shown in detail). 
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Table 13 
Pooled regression with random effects – American banks 
Dependent 
variables 
Loan growth 
rate 
NIM NPL ROA Provisions/ 
Total Assets 
Constant 7.8*** 
(2.6) 
2.0*** 
(7.5) 
 
1.6*** 
(3.5) 
0.71*** 
(3.4) 
0.12 
(1.3) 
Macro 
indicators 
     
GDP growth 0.81*** 
(3.7) 
0.08*** 
(8.6) 
-0.085*** 
(3.0) 
0.026* 
(1.9) 
0.005 
(0.7) 
Inflation -1.12* 
(1.8) 
0.004 
(0.1) 
-0.37*** 
(4.0) 
0.044 
(1.0) 
0.062*** 
(2.9) 
Interest rate 1.4*** 
(5.0) 
0.07*** 
(5.3) 
 
0.17*** 
(4.2) 
-0.015 
(0.8) 
-0.048*** 
(5.3) 
Bank 
indicators 
     
Loan/Asset (-1) -0.11*** 
(4.5) 
0.017*** 
(10.9) 
0.0083** 
(2.3) 
-0.0035** 
(2.0) 
0.004*** 
(5.0) 
Loan growth 
rate (-1) 
 -0.002** 
(2.5) 
-0.013*** 
(5.4) 
0.0011 
(0.4) 
-0.0017*** 
(3.0) 
NIM (-1) 0.44 
(1.6) 
 0.0061 
(0.1) 
0.21*** 
(9.8) 
0.053*** 
(4.8) 
Capital ratio (-1) 0.02 
(0.2) 
0.044*** 
(6.9) 
0.016 
(0.9) 
0.055*** 
(7.5) 
-0.0081** 
(2.1) 
EBTDA/Total 
assets (-1) 
    Insig 
SMALL -0.46 
(0.2) 
0.26 
(1.1) 
-1.2*** 
(3.8) 
-0.33** 
(2.4) 
-0.33*** 
(4.8) 
LARGE 4.4 
(1.3) 
0.67 
(1.5) 
-3.3*** 
(6.0) 
0.15 
(0.6) 
-0.58*** 
(4.5) 
Commercial 
property sector 
     
D(CPP) -0.035 
(0.7) 
-0.015*** 
(6.6) 
-0.041*** 
(6.3) 
5.5*** 
(7.5) 
0.0041*** 
(2.7) 
No. Obs. 
Adj. R2 
2697 
0.07 
2238 
0.27 
2227 
0.21 
2237 
0.26 
2213 
0.24 
Note: See Table 5. t-statistics in parentheses; * shows significance of the test statistic at 90%, ** and *** at 95% and 99% 
respectively. Equations include country dummies (not shown in detail). 
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